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OPINION 
______________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal concerns the Government’s ability to 
compel the decryption of digital devices when the 
Government seizes those devices pursuant to a valid search 
warrant.  The District Court found Appellant John Doe in 
civil contempt for refusing to comply with an order issued 
pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which 
required him to produce several seized devices in a fully 
unencrypted state.  Doe contends that the court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction to issue the order and that the order 
itself violates his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
District Court’s order.  
I. 
 During an investigation into Doe’s access to child 
pornography over the internet, the Delaware County Criminal 
Investigations Unit executed a valid search warrant at Doe’s 
residence.  During the search, officers seized an Apple iPhone 
5S and an Apple Mac Pro Computer with two attached 
Western Digital External Hard Drives, all of which had been 
4 
 
protected with encryption software.1  Police subsequently 
seized a password-protected Apple iPhone 6 Plus as well.   
Agents from the Department of Homeland Security 
then applied for a federal search warrant to examine the 
seized devices.  Doe voluntarily provided the password for 
the Apple iPhone 5S, but refused to provide the passwords to 
decrypt the Apple Mac Pro computer or the external hard 
drives.  Despite Doe’s refusal, forensic analysts discovered 
the password to decrypt the Mac Pro Computer, but could not 
decrypt the external hard drives.  Forensic examination of the 
Mac Pro revealed an image of a pubescent girl in a sexually 
provocative position and logs showing that the Mac Pro had 
been used to visit sites with titles common in child 
exploitation, such as “toddler_cp,” “lolicam,” “tor-childporn,” 
                                              
1 Encryption technology allows a person to transform 
plain, understandable information into unreadable letters, 
numbers, or symbols using a fixed formula or process.  Only 
those who possess a corresponding “key” can return the 
information into its original form, i.e. decrypt that 
information.  Encrypted information remains on the device in 
which it is stored, but exists only in its transformed, 
unintelligible format.   Although encryption may be used to 
hide illegal material, it also assists individuals and businesses 
in lawfully safeguarding the privacy and security of 
information.  Many new devices include encryption tools as 
standard features, and many federal and state laws either 
require or encourage encryption to protect sensitive 
information.  
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and “pthc.”2  (App. 39.)  The Forensic examination also 
disclosed that Doe had downloaded thousands of files known 
by their “hash” values to be child pornography.3  The files, 
however, were not on the Mac Pro, but instead had been 
stored on the encrypted external hard drives.  Accordingly, 
the files themselves could not be accessed. 
As part of their investigation, the Delaware County 
law enforcement officers also interviewed Doe’s sister, who 
had lived with Doe during 2015.  She related that Doe had 
shown her hundreds of images of child pornography on the 
encrypted external hard drives.  She told the investigators that 
                                              
2 According to the affidavit submitted in support of the 
federal Government’s search warrant application, “cp” stands 
for “child pornography” and “pthc” stands for “’pre-teen hard 
core.” (App. 39.) 
 
3 A “hash” is “[a] mathematical algorithm that 
calculates a unique value for a given set of data, similar to a 
digital fingerprint, representing the binary content of the data 
to assist in subsequently ensuring that data has not been 
modified.”  The Sedona Conference Glossary for E-Discovery 
and Digital Information Management 21 (Cheryl B. Harris, et 
al. eds., 4th ed. 2014).  Hash values are commonly used in 
child pornography investigations.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Ross, 837 F.3d 85, 87 (1st Cir. 2014), United States v. 
Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 2016); United 
States v. Thomas, 788 F.3d 345, 348 n. 5 (2nd Cir. 2015); 
United States v. Brown, 701 F.3d 120, 122 (4th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 372, 376 (3d Cir. 
2012; United States v. Cartier, 543 F.3d 442, 444-45 (8th Cir. 
2008). 
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the external hard drives included “videos of children who 
were nude and engaged in sex acts with other children.”  
(App. 40.)  Doe provided the password to access the iPhone 6 
Plus, but did not grant access to an application on the phone 
which contained additional encrypted information.  Forensic 
analysts concluded that the phone’s encrypted database 
contained approximately 2,015 image and video files.  
 On August 3, 2015, upon application of the 
Government, a Magistrate Judge issued an order pursuant to 
the All Writs Act requiring Doe to produce his iPhone 6 Plus, 
his Mac Pro computer, and his two attached external hard 
drives in a fully unencrypted state (the “Decryption Order”).  
Doe did not appeal the Decryption Order.  Instead, he filed 
with the Magistrate Judge a motion to quash the 
Government’s application to compel decryption, arguing that 
his act of decrypting the devices would violate his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.   
 On August 27, 2015, the Magistrate Judge denied 
Doe’s Motion to Quash and directed Doe to fully comply 
with the Decryption Order (the “Quashal Denial”).  The 
Magistrate Judge acknowledged Doe’s Fifth Amendment 
objection but held that, because the Government possessed 
Doe’s devices and knew that their contents included child 
pornography, the act of decrypting the devices would not be 
testimonial for purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.  The Quashal Denial stated that a 
failure to file timely objections could result in the waiver of 
appellate rights.  Doe did not file any objections to the 
Quashal Denial and did not seek review by way of appeal, 
writ of mandamus, or otherwise. 
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 Approximately one week after the Quashal Denial, 
Doe and his counsel appeared at the Delaware County Police 
Department for the forensic examination of his devices.  Doe 
produced the Apple iPhone 6 Plus, including the files on the 
secret application, in a fully unencrypted state by entering 
three separate passwords on the device.  The phone contained 
adult pornography, a video of Doe’s four-year-old niece in 
which she was wearing only her underwear, and 
approximately twenty photographs which focused on the 
genitals of Doe’s six-year-old niece.  Doe, however, stated 
that he could not remember the passwords necessary to 
decrypt the hard drives and entered several incorrect 
passwords during the forensic examination.  The Government 
remains unable to view the decrypted content of the hard 
drives without his assistance.  
 Following the forensic examination, the Magistrate 
Judge granted the Government’s Motion for Order to Show 
Cause Why Doe Should Not Be Held in Contempt, finding 
that Doe willfully disobeyed and resisted the Decryption 
Order.  Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the 
Magistrate Judge found that Doe remembered the passwords 
needed to decrypt the hard drives but chose not to reveal them 
because of the devices’ contents.  The Magistrate Judge 
ordered Doe to appear before the District Court to show cause 
as to why he should not be held in civil contempt.  
 On September 30, 2015, after a hearing, the District 
Court granted the Government’s motion to hold Doe in civil 
contempt.  On October 5, 2015, the District Court issued a 
“Supplemental Order to articulate the reasons for its 
September 30th Order.”  (App. at 12.)  The District Court 
noted that the Government’s prima facie case of contempt 
was largely, if not entirely, uncontested.  While the 
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Government presented several witnesses to support its 
motion, Doe neither testified nor called witnesses.  He offered 
no physical or documentary evidence into the record and 
provided no explanation for his failure to comply with the 
Decryption Order.  The District Court remanded Doe to the 
custody of the United States Marshals to be incarcerated until 
he fully complies with the Decryption Order.  This timely 
appeal followed.   
II. 
  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  We ordinarily exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s authority to issue an order pursuant to the All Writs 
Act, Grider v. Keystone Health Plan Cent., Inc., 500 F.3d 
322, 327 (3d Cir. 2007), and “review a district court’s 
decision on a motion for contempt for abuse of discretion.”  
Marshak v. Treadwell, 595 F.3d 478, 485 (3d Cir. 2009).  
However, when the party seeking review has failed to 
preserve the issue in the trial court, we review only for plain 
error.  See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 
2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2007).  We 
nonetheless exercise plenary review over challenges 
concerning subject matter jurisdiction.  United States v. 
Merlino, 785 F.3d 79, 82 (3d Cir. 2015). 
III. 
 Doe raises two primary arguments as to why he should 
not be held in contempt. First, he asserts that the District 
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the 
Decryption Order under the All Writs Act.  Thus, he argues 
that he is not in contempt of any valid order and the judgment 
of contempt must be vacated.  Second, Doe contends that the 
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Decryption Order violates his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.     
A. 
 Doe’s first challenge concerns the All Writs Act, 
which permits federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or 
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and 
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”  28 U.S.C. § 
1651(a).  The All Writs Act does not itself confer any subject 
matter jurisdiction, but rather only allows a federal court to 
issue writs “in aid of” its existing jurisdiction.  Clinton v. 
Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 534 (1999); Sygenta Crop Prot., 
Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 31 (2002); see also In re 
Arunachalum, 812 F.3d 290, 292 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam).   
Therefore, a court has subject matter jurisdiction over an 
application for an All Writs Act order only when it has 
subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying order that the 
All Writs Act order is intended to effectuate.  Additionally, a 
federal court may only issue an All Writs Act order “as may 
be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent the 
frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of 
jurisdiction otherwise obtained.”  United States v. N.Y. Tel. 
Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977).   
 Doe contends that the Magistrate Judge did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction to issue the Decryption Order 
because the Government should have compelled his 
compliance by means of the grand jury procedure and not the 
All Writs Act.  The grand jury process, however, is not the 
exclusive means by which the Government may collect 
evidence prior to indictment.  See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 
436 U.S. 547, 559 (1978) (allowing the Government to 
proceed by search warrant despite insistence that the 
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investigation should proceed by subpoena); United States v. 
Educ. Dev. Network Corp., 884 F.2d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(rejecting the argument that the Government could not obtain 
evidence by means of a search warrant and must proceed 
solely by grand jury). Here, the Magistrate Judge had subject 
matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
41 to issue a search warrant4 and therefore had jurisdiction to 
issue an order under the All Writs Act that sought “to 
effectuate and prevent the frustration” of that warrant.  United 
States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977).   
 In arguing that the Magistrate Judge did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction to issue the Decryption Order, Doe 
also challenges the merits of that order, contending that it was 
not a “necessary and appropriate means” of effectuating the 
original warrant as required by the Supreme Court in New 
York Telephone.  A contempt proceeding, however, generally 
“‘does not open to reconsideration the legal or factual basis of 
the order alleged to have been disobeyed.’”5  United States v. 
                                              
4 Doe does not dispute the validity of the underlying 
search warrant issued by a Magistrate Judge under Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 41. 
 
5 There are, of course, instances when a contempt 
proceeding may be the only avenue for challenging the 
underlying order to produce information.  For example, 
judicial review of a grand jury subpoena may be obtained 
only by refusal to comply with the subpoena, with the validity 
of the subpoena being litigated in the ensuing contempt 
proceeding.  See, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 
532-33 (1971) (“[W]e have consistently held that the 
necessity for expedition in the administration of the criminal 
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Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 756 (1983) (quoting Maggio v. Zeitz, 
333 U.S. 56, 69 (1948)); In re Contemporary Apparel, Inc., 
488 F.2d 794, 798 (3d Cir. 1973) (same).  Furthermore, Doe 
did not argue in the District Court that the Decryption Order 
was not an appropriate exercise of authority under the All 
Writs Act.  Thus, even if the propriety of the Decryption 
Order was before us, our review would be limited to plain 
error.  Brightwell, 637 F.3d at 193.  Under this framework, an 
appellant must show four elements: “(1) there is an ‘error’; 
(2) the error is ‘clear or obvious, rather than subject to 
reasonable dispute’; (3) the error ‘affected the appellant’s 
substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means’ it 
‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings’; and 
(4) ‘the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”  United States v. 
Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (quoting Puckett v. United 
States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)).   
 
 In New York Telephone, the district court had issued an 
order authorizing federal agents to install pen registers in two 
telephones and directed the New York Telephone Company 
                                                                                                     
law justifies putting one who seeks to resist the production [to 
a grand jury] of desired information to a choice between 
compliance with a trial court’s order to produce prior to any 
review of that order, and resistance to that order with the 
concomitant possibility of an adjudication of contempt if his 
claims are rejected on appeal.”); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 
709 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10th Cir. 2013)(“A protesting [grand 
jury] witness may seek appellate review only after he refuses 
to obey the subpoena and is held in contempt.”). 
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to furnish “all information, facilities and technical assistance” 
necessary to accomplish the installation.  N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 
U.S. at 161.  The Company argued that neither Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 41 nor the All Writs Act “provided any basis for such an 
order.”  Id. at 163.  The Supreme Court, however, found that 
this order was “clearly authorized by the All Writs Act” as a 
necessary and appropriate means of effectuating the 
installation of the pen registers.  Id. at 172.   
 Here, the Magistrate Judge issued a search warrant for 
the devices seized at Doe’s residence.  When law 
enforcement could not decrypt the contents of those devices, 
and Doe refused to comply, the Magistrate Judge issued the 
Decryption Order pursuant to the All Writs Act.  The 
Decryption Order required Doe to “assist the Government in 
the execution of the…search warrant” by producing his 
devices in “a fully unencrypted state.”  As was the case in 
New York Telephone, the Decryption Order here was a 
necessary and appropriate means of effectuating the original 
search warrant.   
 Doe asserts that New York Telephone should not apply 
because the All Writs Act order in that case compelled a third 
party to assist in the execution of that warrant, and not the 
target of the government investigation.  The Supreme Court 
explained, however, that the Act extends to anyone “in a 
position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the 
proper administration of justice” as long as there are 
“appropriate circumstances” for doing so.  Id. at 174.  Here, 
as in New York Telephone: (1) Doe is not “far removed from 
the underlying controversy;” (2) “compliance with [the 
Decryption Order] require[s] minimal effort;” and (3) 
“without [Doe’s] assistance there is no conceivable way in 
which the [search warrant] authorized by the District Court 
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could [be] successfully accomplished.”  Id. at 174-175.  
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge did not plainly err in 
issuing the Decryption Order.   
B. 
 Doe also contends that the Decryption Order violates 
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and 
that this challenge is subject to plenary review.  Doe raised a 
Fifth Amendment challenge in his Motion to Quash the 
Decryption Order.  The Magistrate Judge denied that 
challenge, rejecting the argument that Doe’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege would be violated.  Doe did not file 
objections to that order, nor did he seek review by way of 
appeal, writ of mandamus or otherwise, despite the Quashal 
Denial order informing Doe that failure to file a timely 
objection may constitute a waiver of appellate rights.  Doe 
also did not renew this self-incrimination claim during the 
contempt proceedings before the Magistrate Judge and the 
District Judge.6  Instead, Doe only reasserted his Fifth 
Amendment claim in this appeal.   
While Doe persists that his challenge to the contempt 
order entitles him to plenary consideration of the Fifth 
Amendment issue, we disagree.  As noted above, it is 
                                              
6 In its Order explaining the contempt ruling, the 
District Judge observed that Doe had failed to object to the 
Magistrate Judge’s determination that Doe’s Fifth 
Amendment rights were not violated by the Decryption Order 
despite being warned that such failure “may constitute a 
waiver of appellate rights.”  (App. at 15 (citing United States 
v. Polishan, 336 F.3d 234, 240 (3d Cir. 2003).)  Thus, the 
District Court did not address the Fifth Amendment issue. 
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generally the case that “a contempt proceeding does not open 
to reconsideration the legal or factual basis of the order 
alleged to have been disobeyed.”  Rylander, 460 U.S. at 756 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Even if we could assess the Fifth Amendment decision 
of the Magistrate Judge, our review would be limited to plain 
error.  See United States v. Schwartz, 446 F.2d 571, 576 (3d 
Cir. 1971) (applying plain error review to unpreserved claim 
of violation of privilege against self-incrimination).  Doe’s 
arguments fail under this deferential standard of review.  
 The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person…shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fifth Amendment, 
however, “does not independently proscribe the compelled 
production of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies 
only when the accused is compelled to make a Testimonial 
Communication that is incriminating.”  Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).  To be testimonial, a 
communication must either “explicitly or implicitly . . . relate 
a factual assertion or disclose information.”  Doe v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).   
 The Supreme Court has recognized that in some 
instances, the production of evidence can implicate the Fifth 
Amendment.   In Fisher, the Court stated that “[t]he act of 
producing evidence in response to a subpoena . . . has 
communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the 
contents of the papers produced.”  425 U.S. at 410.  The 
Court reasoned that compliance with a request for evidence 
may “tacitly concede[ ] the existence of the documents 
demanded and their possession and control by the 
[defendant].”  Id.  By “producing documents, one 
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acknowledges that the documents exist, admits that the 
documents are in one’s custody, and concedes that the 
documents are those that the [Government] requests.”  United 
States v. Chabot, 793 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 559 (2015).  When the production of evidence does 
concede the existence, custody, and authenticity of that 
evidence, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination applies because that production constitutes 
compelled testimony.  
 In Fisher, however, the Court also articulated the 
“foregone conclusion” rule, which acts as an exception to the 
otherwise applicable act-of-production doctrine.  Fisher, 425 
U.S. at 411.  Under this rule, the Fifth Amendment does not 
protect an act of production when any potentially testimonial 
component of the act of production—such as the existence, 
custody, and authenticity of evidence—is a “foregone 
conclusion” that “adds little or nothing to the sum total of the 
Government’s information.”  Id.  For the rule to apply, the 
Government must be able to “describe with reasonable 
particularity” the documents or evidence it seeks to compel.  
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 30. 
 Although we have not confronted the Fifth 
Amendment implications of compelled decryption, the 
Eleventh Circuit has addressed the issue and found that the 
privilege against self-incrimination should apply.  In that 
case, a suspect appealed a judgment of contempt entered after 
he refused to produce the unencrypted contents of his laptop 
and hard drives.  In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012).  
The court found that “(1) [the suspect’s] decryption and 
production of the contents of the drives would be testimonial, 
not merely a physical act; and (2) the explicit and implicit 
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factual communications associated with the decryption and 
production are not foregone conclusions.”  Id. at 1346.  The 
court reached this decision after noting that the Government 
did not show whether any files existed on the hard drives and 
could not show with any reasonable particularity that the 
suspect could access the encrypted portions of the drives.  Id.  
Although the court did not require the Government to identify 
exactly the documents it sought, it did require that, at the very 
least, the Government be able to demonstrate some 
knowledge that files do exist on the encrypted devices.  Id. at 
1348–49.   
 Despite Doe’s argument to the contrary, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s reasoning in In re Grand Jury Subpoena does not 
compel a similar result here.  In the Quashal Denial, the 
Magistrate Judge found that, though the Fifth Amendment 
may be implicated by Doe’s decryption of the devices, any 
testimonial aspects of that production were a foregone 
conclusion.  According to the Magistrate Judge, the affidavit 
supporting the application for the search warrant established 
that (1) the Government had custody of the devices; (2) prior 
to the seizure, Doe possessed, accessed, and owned all 
devices; and (3) there are images on the electronic devices 
that constitute child pornography.  Thus, the Magistrate Judge 
concluded that the Decryption Order did not violate Doe’s 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
 Unlike In re Grand Jury Subpoena, the Government 
has provided evidence to show both that files exist on the 
encrypted portions of the devices and that Doe can access 
them.  The affidavit supporting the search warrant states that 
an investigation led to the identification of Doe as a user of an 
internet file sharing network that was used to access child 
pornography.  When executing a search of Doe’s residence, 
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forensic analysts found the encrypted devices, and Doe does 
not dispute their existence or his ownership of them.  Once 
the analysts accessed Doe’s Mac Pro Computer, they found 
one image depicting a pubescent girl in a sexually suggestive 
position and logs that suggested the user had visited groups 
with titles common in child exploitation.  Doe’s sister then 
reported that she had witnessed Doe unlock his Mac Pro 
while connected to the hard drives to show her hundreds of 
pictures and videos of child pornography.  Forensic analysts 
also found an additional 2,015 videos and photographs in an 
encrypted application on Doe’s phone, which Doe had opened 
for the police by entering a password.  Based on these facts, 
the Magistrate Judge found that, for the purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment, any testimonial component of the production of 
decrypted devices added little or nothing to the information 
already obtained by the Government.  The Magistrate Judge 
determined that any testimonial component would be a 
foregone conclusion.  The Magistrate Judge did not commit a 
clear or obvious error in his application of the foregone 
conclusion doctrine.  In this regard, the Magistrate Judge 
rested his decision rejecting the Fifth Amendment challenge 
on factual findings that are amply supported by the record.7  
                                              
7 It is important to note that we are not concluding that 
the Government’s knowledge of the content of the devices is 
necessarily the correct focus of the “foregone conclusion” 
inquiry in the context of a compelled decryption order.  
Instead, a very sound argument can be made that the foregone 
conclusion doctrine properly focuses on whether the 
Government already knows the testimony that is implicit in 
the act of production.  In this case, the fact known to the 
government that is implicit in the act of providing the 
password for the devices is "I, John Doe, know the password 
18 
 
Accordingly, Doe’s challenges to the Decryption Order and 
Quashal Denial fail.  
 So, too, does Doe’s challenge to the contempt order.  
At the hearing on the contempt motion, Doe maintained that 
he could not remember the passwords to decrypt the hard 
drives.  In a civil contempt proceeding, when a defendant 
raises a challenge of impossibility of compliance, “the 
defendant bears the burden of production.”  United States v. 
Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983).  At the contempt 
hearing, the Government presented several witnesses to 
support its prima facie case of contempt.  Doe’s sister 
testified to the fact that, while in her presence, Doe accessed 
child pornography files on his Mac Pro computer by means of 
entering passwords from memory.  Further, a detective who 
executed the original search warrant stated that Doe did not 
provide his password at the time because he wanted to 
prevent the police from accessing his computer.  Doe never 
asserted an inability to remember the passwords at that time.  
Doe presented no evidence to explain his failure to comply or 
                                                                                                     
for these devices."  Based upon the testimony presented at the 
contempt proceeding, that fact is a foregone conclusion.  
However, because our review is limited to plain error, and no 
plain error was committed by the District Court in finding 
that the Government established that the contents of the 
encrypted hard drives are known to it, we need not decide 
here that the inquiry can be limited to the question of whether 
Doe’s knowledge of the password itself is sufficient to 
support application of the foregone conclusion doctrine. 
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to challenge the evidence brought by the Government.  The 
District Court thus found Doe in contempt and ordered he be 
held in custody until he complies with the Decryption Order.  
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding Doe 
to be in contempt of the Decryption Order.  
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order of September 30, 2015 holding Appellant John 
Doe in civil contempt.  
